Strategic Resource Intelligence
Strategic Minerals in the New World Order
Stockpile security and mineral dependence, 1993–2026
In 1993, Kent Hughes Butts argued that the end of the Cold War did not end mineral dependence. Today, the practical question is whether industry can obtain the right material, in the right form, before a disruption interrupts production.
01 / Analysis
What the 1993 paper argues
Butts examines chromium, cobalt, manganese and platinum-group metals, concentrated supplies in southern Africa and the former Soviet Union, and U.S. import vulnerability. He challenges short-war assumptions behind stockpile reductions and recommends retention and modernization, alongside substitution, domestic production, diversified supply and resource diplomacy.
This is the author's 1993 policy argument, not an official Army, Defense Department or U.S. government position. Its country assessments and mineral statistics describe that period. [1]
02 / Analysis
Update the mineral balance
The four mineral groups in Butts's study remain useful starting points for supply-chain research. The figures below update the comparison with U.S. net import reliance for 2025, rather than carrying forward the report's historical dependency estimates.
Scroll horizontally to read all columns →
| Mineral group | Net import reliance | Reported uses | Research question |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chromium | 79% | Stainless steel and alloy production. [2] | Which ferroalloy plants can turn available feedstock into the required grade? |
| Cobalt | 79% | Superalloys, chemicals and other industrial applications. [2] | Can the buyer obtain qualified metal or chemicals through an alternative processing route? |
| Manganese | 100% | Steelmaking remains its principal demand connection. [2] | Are ore, ferroalloy and high-purity chemical exposures being measured separately? |
| Platinum-group metals | Platinum 89% · Palladium 57% | Catalysts, electronics and specialized industrial uses. [2] | Which individual metal and application can actually be substituted? |
Net import reliance describes the balance of a defined U.S. commodity market. It is not the share of a weapons system imported, the probability of supply loss or a measure of days of stock remaining. Platinum and palladium have separate figures; the table does not assign one percentage to all PGMs.
Our interpretation is to trace the production stage and customer requirement behind each percentage. An ore shipment, a refined metal and a qualified alloy are different supply propositions. A country-level comparison is the beginning of that investigation.
Explore mine production and reported reserves in the Mineral Atlas →
03 / Analysis
A reserve must be usable when it is needed
Butts treats stockpiling as insurance against interrupted imports and argues that its composition must change with technology. He also distinguishes storing material from maintaining the smelters needed to upgrade it. [1]
10 September 2024 report · fiscal year 2023 evidence
The 2024 audit identified a requirements-data gap
- Reported fact
- GAO found that DOD lacked data to model requirements for 115 of 263 materials it wanted to assess in fiscal year 2023. [3]
- SilverWars analysis
- A stockpile assessment needs the demand model, its assumptions and the material specifications, not just a dollar value for inventory.
- Evidence limit
- This is a dated audit baseline. It does not establish that the same data gap remains unchanged in October 2026.
GAO recommendation status reviewed 3 October 2026
The follow-up records improvements in governance
- Reported fact
- GAO now marks all six recommendations Closed – Implemented. Its follow-up describes April 2026 supply-and-demand responsibilities and August 2025 criteria for requesting releases. [3]
- SilverWars analysis
- The research task now includes testing whether documented procedures translate into usable buffers and timely deliveries under a specified disruption.
- Evidence limit
- Closed recommendations verify actions against the audit's recommendations. They do not certify that every material shortfall is eliminated or that all required stock is on hand.
Model demand
What consumption and disruption period define the requirement?
Match the material
Is the stored form usable by the intended manufacturer?
Release and deliver
Who can authorize, transport and qualify it in time?
Replenish capacity
Which operating plants can replace the material consumed?
These are our proposed tests for readiness. The buffer should be measured against the exposed production process and replacement lead time. Nominal tonnage is insufficient if the material still needs processing at the facility that has been disrupted.
04 / Analysis
Mineral access is also industrial bargaining power
The current evidence broadens the 1993 framework beyond reserve geography. Producer rules, refining concentration and trade negotiations can alter access even when a deposit continues to operate.
July 2026 IEA assessment
Producer policy can reshape available supply
- Reported fact
- The IEA identifies the DRC's cobalt export quota as a change that reshapes its projected supply outlook. [4]
- SilverWars analysis
- Track the rule, eligible exporter, shipment flow and customer exposure. Producing states can influence the terms on which material reaches foreign industry; sovereignty and buyer resilience must both enter the assessment.
- Evidence limit
- The outlook's projection is not a live measurement of export approvals, customs flows or a shortage at a particular buyer.
2025 measurement · July 2026 IEA report
Mine diversification can leave a refining dependency intact
- Reported fact
- Excluding rare earths, the IEA reports that the average share of the leading refining country rose from 70% in 2023 to 72% in 2025. [4]
- SilverWars analysis
- Map refining, chemicals, alloys and component qualification separately from the mine. A new upstream supplier contributes less resilience if every route still depends on the same processor.
- Evidence limit
- This is an average for assessed markets. It is not a refining share for all minerals or proof that a supplier intends to interrupt trade.
14 January 2026 U.S. proclamation
Security policy now targets processed materials
- Reported fact
- The U.S. proclamation directs negotiations on processed critical minerals and derivative products, including consideration of price floors and other trade measures. [5]
- SilverWars analysis
- Evaluate partnerships through commissioning, delivered output and benefits for the producer. A security agreement gains practical value when it supports an operating supply route that both parties have reason to maintain.
- Evidence limit
- The proclamation establishes a negotiating direction. This assessment does not claim that every negotiation succeeded or that a universal mineral tariff followed.
July 2026 IEA assessment
Stockpiles provide time to respond
- Reported fact
- The IEA describes strategic mineral stockpiles as a short-term buffer against supply disruptions. [4]
- SilverWars analysis
- Use that time to qualify alternatives, reroute supplies or restore capacity. Buffer inventories and long-term industrial investment address different parts of the same exposure.
- Evidence limit
- A stockpiling policy is not evidence of adequate inventory for every grade, manufacturer or emergency scenario.
05 / Analysis
Build the silver case from silver evidence
The reviewed 1993 report does not provide a silver commodity analysis or a silver-specific stockpile recommendation. Its general resilience framework can guide new silver research. [1]
USGS added silver to the final 2025 U.S. critical-minerals list on 6 November. The 2026 commodity summary estimates silver's U.S. net import reliance at 77% for 2025 and lists electrical and electronics uses, photovoltaics, and brazing and soldering among its applications. [6] [2]
These are a U.S. designation and dated market statistics. They do not quantify military silver demand, prove an immediate shortage or establish an application-wide lack of substitutes. Substitution must be tested against the performance and qualification requirements of the individual use.
Our silver investigation should follow the usable product: refined metal, contact material, brazing alloy, paste or another specified input. The relevant evidence is buyer qualification, refinery and fabrication capacity, recoverable scrap, inventory offered for delivery and the time needed to replace an interrupted supplier.
Examine the silver data and methodology audit →
Trace military and aerospace silver specifications →
06 / Analysis
Turn mineral vulnerability into a testable record
These are proposed OSINT research questions. They define evidence to collect rather than assert that a disruption, shortage or failure has occurred.
Requirements and material form
Which grade, purity, alloy or compound does the exposed production process require?
Evidence to seek Specifications, procurement descriptions, qualification records and documented consumption assumptions.
Operating industrial capacity
Which mines, refineries, smelters and fabricators can deliver that material now?
Evidence to seek Operating throughput, recovery rates, maintenance notices, customer approvals and shipment records.
Stockpile coverage
How long would usable inventory support the defined demand after a supplier or route is interrupted?
Evidence to seek Inventory by usable form, release criteria, transport timing and demand under the stated scenario. Preserve unknowns where records are unavailable.
Producer agency and supply terms
Who owns the assets and offtake rights, and what benefits make the host willing to sustain the arrangement?
Evidence to seek Filings, contracts, financing, local processing commitments, fiscal terms and host-country policy notices.
Replacement and replenishment
Can another route be brought into service before the buffer is exhausted?
Evidence to seek Permitting, equipment, feedstock, financing, commissioning and customer-qualification milestones.
Read the companion analysis of the 1996 world-order framework →
07 / Analysis
Sources and analytical limits
A strategic resource intelligence assessment reviewed on 3 October 2026. Historical claims retain their 1993 setting; current comparisons use 2025 estimates in the USGS 2026 edition and dated policy and audit records. This page does not establish live inventories, classified military requirements or complete implementation of mineral policy.
Reported facts retain their source dates and definitions. The resource implications and research questions are SilverWars analysis. Policy announcements and critical-mineral designations do not by themselves prove adequate inventory or an inevitable shortage.
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01
Primary white paper
Strategic Minerals in the New World Order
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College · November 30, 1993
Evidence and source limits
- Locator
- Summary v–xiii; printed 1–9, 23–38; PDF 9–17, 18–26, 40–55. Metadata cross-checked against the Army War College catalog.
- Supports
- The original mineral-security argument, four focal mineral groups and stockpile recommendations.
- Limit
- Historical author assessment; no official government endorsement or silver-specific stockpile analysis.
- Reviewed
- October 3, 2026
-
02
Primary government statistics
Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 · version 1.3
U.S. Geological Survey · February 2026 · Edition updated May 2026
Evidence and source limits
- Locator
- Chromium printed 66/PDF 70; cobalt 70/74; manganese 124/128; PGMs 144/148; silver 172/176; commodity definitions and footnotes.
- Supports
- 2025 net import reliance estimates and selected commodity uses. Platinum and palladium are separate measures.
- Limit
- Apparent-consumption accounting is not a weapon-system exposure estimate, shortage probability or measure of immediately available inventory.
- Reviewed
- October 3, 2026
-
03
Primary audit and implementation follow-up
National Defense Stockpile: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Efforts to Prepare for Emergencies
U.S. Government Accountability Office · September 10, 2024
Evidence and source limits
- Locator
- GAO-24-106959 highlights; full report printed p8 for 115 of 263 materials; Recommendations 1–6 and current status explanations.
- Supports
- Fiscal-year-2023 requirements-data finding and all six recommendations marked Closed – Implemented, including April 2026 and August 2025 governance actions.
- Limit
- Implemented recommendations do not certify complete physical stockpile adequacy. Follow-up status was read on the review date; classified requirements were not accessed.
- Reviewed
- October 3, 2026
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04
Primary institutional analysis
Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 executive summary
International Energy Agency · July 16, 2026
Evidence and source limits
- Locator
- DRC cobalt export quota; refining concentration; strategic stockpiles and emergency buffers.
- Supports
- Dated assessments of producer policy, the leading refiner's average share and stockpiling as a short-term resilience measure.
- Limit
- Coverage, averages and projections must remain attached to the report's period; this source does not establish live stocks or an individual buyer's shortage.
- Reviewed
- October 3, 2026
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05
Primary policy document
Adjusting Imports of Processed Critical Minerals and Their Derivative Products
The White House · January 14, 2026
Evidence and source limits
- Locator
- Paragraphs 6, 13 and operative provision 1.
- Supports
- Security framing and direction to negotiate on processed critical minerals, including consideration of price floors.
- Limit
- A stated policy direction, not independent verification of every vulnerability or evidence of all negotiation outcomes.
- Reviewed
- October 3, 2026
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06
Primary government announcement
Interior Department releases final 2025 List of Critical Minerals
U.S. Geological Survey · November 14, 2025 · Event November 6, 2025
Evidence and source limits
- Locator
- Opening paragraphs, new mineral additions and silver use description.
- Supports
- Silver's addition to the final U.S. list on 6 November 2025; announcement posted 14 November.
- Limit
- A jurisdiction-specific designation does not quantify military requirements or prove a current shortage.
- Reviewed
- October 3, 2026
Original document provenance
Reviewed 60-page archived PDF. Printed report numbering and PDF viewer numbering differ; links use the PDF viewer page. Original file SHA-256:
39800b261e218ad693773e7ee1263aee7a156bdac0f996affa91bc7df0f9ed79Verify the Army War College catalog record ↗
Research record version 1.0 · Download the structured source record
Strategic Resource Intelligence